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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3661 
___________ 
 
AIMAL KHAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENN STATE – MILTON S. HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL  
PENN STATE COLLEGE OF MEDICINE  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-00128) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 18, 2014 
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH , Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Aimal Khan appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Milton S. Hersey Medical Center (“MSHMC”) and dismissing 
his complaint.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 In early 2011, Khan filed a complaint in the District Court.  In his Second 
Amended Complaint (hereinafter “the complaint”), Khan alleged that, in retaliation for 
taking leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act in late 2007 and early 2008, 
MSHMC failed to renew his residency fellowship in 2010.  He also argued that MSHMC 
treated him differently than the other residents in his program on account of his use of 
FMLA leave, and he charged MSHMC with breach of contract, tortious interference with 
prospective contractual relations, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  He sought attorney’s fees, prospective injunctive relief, lost pay, and damages. 
 MSHMC filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted as to all 
claims except Khan’s retaliation claim.  After discovery, MSHMC moved for summary 
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that (1) a two-year statute of limitations should apply to 
Khan’s claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c); (2) Khan had not established a prima 
facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, as he had not suffered an adverse employment 
action and had not demonstrated a causal relationship between his FMLA leave and the 
non-renewal of his residency; and (3) even assuming Khan had established a prima facie 
case, MSHMC had articulated legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for its decision not to 
renew Khan’s residency. 
 Khan then requested three extensions of time to file an opposition to summary 
judgment, each of which was granted by the District Court.  In granting the third 
extension, the District Court stated that it would be the final extension.  On the last day of 
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his third extension, Khan requested a fourth extension.  The District Court denied his 
request and, ruling on the motion for summary judgment, determined that Khan had 
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA.  Accordingly, the 
District Court granted MSHMC’s motion for summary judgment.  Khan appeals. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review for abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s decision to deny Khan’s motion for an extension.  Drippe 
v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 779 n.1, 783 (3d Cir. 2010).  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment.  See Alcoa, Inc. v. United 
States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm. 
III. 
 Khan challenges, first and foremost, the District Court’s decision to deny his 
fourth request for an extension of time to file a brief in opposition to MSHMC’s motion 
for summary judgment.  “[M]atters of docket control . . . are committed to the sound 
discretion of the district court.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d 
Cir. 1982); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1).  In granting Khan’s third request for an 
extension, the District Court noted that it had already granted two prior requests and that 
Khan had already had over three months to file his brief in opposition to summary 
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judgment.  The District Court then warned that the third extension would be the “final 
extension,” and that, should Khan fail to file his brief in opposition to summary judgment 
within 20 days of the District Court’s order, the District Court “may, in its discretion, 
grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss the case with prejudice.”  In light of the number of 
extensions that Khan received, the amount of time that Khan had to file his opposition 
brief, and the explicitness of the District Court’s warning that the third extension was to 
be the final extension, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Khan’s fourth request for an extension of time to file a brief in opposition to 
summary judgment.
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 Khan also alleges that the District Judge was biased against him and treated him 
“unjustly” by denying his fourth motion for an extension.  We note that Khan did not 
seek recusal in the District Court.  In any event, a judge must recuse “if a reasonable man, 
were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge’s 
impartiality . . . .”  Id. at 167.  However, “a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not 
                                              
1
 The District Court then properly turned to the merits of MSHMC’s motion for summary 
judgment.  See e.g., United States v. One Piece of Real Prop., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (noting that a district court should not “base the entry of summary judgment 
on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed”).  However, Khan failed in his briefing 
to us to raise any challenge to the correctness of the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Thus, that issue is waived.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 201 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that where “an appellant fails to raise an issue in an appellate 
brief, even if it was listed in the Notice of Appeal, it is deemed waived”).  Similarly, to 
the extent that Khan wished to appeal the District Court’s dismissal of his claims for 
attorney’s fees, breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective contractual 
relations, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, he failed to raise 
those issues in his appellate brief.  See id. 
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form an adequate basis for recusal.”  Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 
224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the sole basis for Khan’s allegation of bias is the 
ruling against him.  Moreover, Khan has not shown any appearance of partiality.  See 
Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004).  The 
District Judge did not err by failing to recuse himself sua sponte.  
 In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in favor of 
MSHMC. 
